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Christophe Wasinski: AI Is Increasing Likelihood of War

كريستوف وازنسكي: الذكاء الاصطناعي يشجّع على الحروب كريستوف وازنسكي: الذكاء الاصطناعي يشجّع على الحروب

Christophe Wasinski, a professor of political science at the Université libre de Bruxelles specializing in war, technology, and artificial intelligence, told Al-Khat that the growing ease with which major powers resort to war is rooted in broader conditions, particularly technological developments.

Q: Your work focuses on security and armament, and more recently you have turned your attention to artificial intelligence in the context of war. Could you begin by telling us about your research background?

A: I have been working on security and defense issues for a very long time. I completed my PhD in the early 2000s on military affairs, specifically classical military thought and military thinking in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. I have also published analytical studies on military and strategic discourse. My interest in security, then, stems from a longstanding and deeply personal interest in these questions.

For more than a decade, I have also been closely interested in what is known as the “Global War on Terror.” I put the term in quotation marks because I see it as a form of neocolonial warfare that refuses to acknowledge its true nature.

I should also mention the considerable influence of the scholar Laleh Khalili, if I am pronouncing her name correctly. In her book Time in the Shadows, she offers an in-depth analysis of the techniques used by Israel and the United States in the war on terror, examining them through a neocolonial lens.

I have also long been interested in armament and teach a course on the subject at the Université libre de Bruxelles. Through a largely empirical approach, I have come to the conclusion that it is useful to distinguish between different categories of weapons when studying armament. Nuclear, chemical, conventional, and lethal weapons, for example, should be examined separately because their production and use follow markedly different patterns.

At a certain point, I decided that I needed to study artificial intelligence in greater depth, particularly so that I could teach my students about it properly and from a critical perspective. This meant developing a comprehensive critical framework, placing these technologies in their historical context, and examining the economic interests at stake in their use, which I consider central to the issue. This led me to work on the subject and prepare a report for the Brussels-based Group for Research and Information on Peace (GRIP).

Q: Most analyses focus on the political figures who lead wars, and on their interests and calculations, particularly economic and strategic ones. Much less attention is paid to the machinery of war itself. In other words, how is the decision to go to war made today, in the age of artificial intelligence?

A: This question interests me greatly. My research draws on an approach that seeks to be what, if I may use some sociological terminology, is called an “understanding” approach. In sociology and the humanities, there are two broad approaches to research: explanatory approaches and interpretive approaches.

An explanatory approach might argue, for example, that the 2003 war on Iraq was driven by oil, or that it was launched because of George W. Bush, then president of the United States and a member of the neoconservative camp.

An interpretive approach, by contrast, might argue that Russia is waging war in Ukraine to preserve its sphere of influence.

The explanatory approach focuses on relatively direct causes. The interpretive approach is somewhat different. It seeks to understand the conditions that make war and violence possible.

The point is not necessarily to identify a direct cause or offer an immediate explanation. It is to understand the circumstances and environment that make war possible at a particular moment. Context, in other words, takes on greater importance.

The relationship between artificial intelligence and the wars taking place in the Middle East offers a good example of what I mean by this interpretive approach.

We can begin, for instance, with Edward Said’s work on Orientalism. Said showed how a discourse has developed over time that portrays the Middle East, in particular, as a dangerous region. This discourse creates a set of assumptions in the realm of imagination, perceptions, ideas, and language. It prepares the ground for military intervention and makes such intervention more acceptable.

Military and strategic discourses also establish conditions that allow certain decision-makers to believe they can use force and violence as tools to achieve specific goals.

I believe that infrastructure and material capabilities are also among the conditions that make conflict and war possible. In the case I am examining, artificial intelligence is itself one of these conditions. It can help create the circumstances in which a war breaks out.

These preconditions may include an exaggerated sense of power or a desire to test these systems in a particular setting.

They do not usually determine political decisions directly. But they create an environment in which such decisions become possible, and may even encourage them.

Consider how military officers in the United States, Israel, Iran, France, and other countries involved in military interventions repeatedly assure political leaders that they possess effective military tools capable of securing victory. By doing so, they reinforce decision-makers’ confidence in their ability to use force. In this way, they help shape the conditions in which political decisions are made.

Military officers do not necessarily decide to launch wars themselves. But they exert, at the very least, an indirect influence on the political decision-making process.

Q: In your research, have you noticed any parallels between the current development of artificial intelligence and the emergence of nuclear weapons several decades ago?

A: I do not think we have entered an entirely new era. I would not draw a direct comparison with nuclear weapons, although there are certainly some specific similarities.

I would rather compare the current moment with another development that began to take shape in the 1970s and 1980s. During that period, military equipment increasingly incorporated electronic devices, sensors, and computers.

Conventional weapons, from tanks and artillery to fighter jets and bombers, began to be fitted with a wide range of electronic systems. These were supposed to make it possible to identify and strike targets with greater precision and selectivity, reduce civilian casualties, and so on.

In the 1970s and 1980s, and particularly in the early 1990s, the United States began talking about what it called a “revolution in military affairs.” This discourse later spread across Europe and the rest of the world. It suggested that military equipment had become far more advanced and effective than in the past.

Some capabilities did improve. But when these systems were put to use, particularly against Iraq in 1991, they did not produce a decisive political outcome. The United States failed to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s government after the 1991 war. Instead, it remained engaged in a prolonged, largely undeclared conflict with Iraq for more than a decade, through economic sanctions and intermittent bombing.

Even then, there were promises of what might be called “magic” military equipment, supposedly capable of delivering decisive and far-reaching results.

But that did not happen.

I think we are seeing a somewhat similar pattern with artificial intelligence today.

Q: In an article, you wrote about companies that profit from surveillance projects. Could you explain how these companies are connected to the state?

A: The arms industry, particularly in the United States, includes major companies that have been around for decades. These are the traditional weapons manufacturers. The most prominent is Lockheed Martin, whose annual revenue runs into tens of billions of dollars. It produces fighter jets and bombers, among other equipment for the US armed forces. Other major companies include RTX, formerly known as Raytheon; Northrop Grumman; General Dynamics; and Boeing.

These are all multinational corporations that play a crucial role in supplying the armed forces and generate billions of dollars in business. They provide the Pentagon with most of its conventional and nuclear weapons systems, from fighter jets and bombers to missiles, submarines, and tanks.

These companies are highly visible and well known to specialists in security and defense. We know their names and what they do. But alongside them, other companies have emerged over the decades that operate much further from the public eye.

Some are not entirely new. Booz Allen Hamilton, for example, is a consulting firm that works for intelligence agencies as well as the Pentagon. It has been around for many years. It does not manufacture physical equipment such as tanks, but it plays a major role in logistics and in organizing the Pentagon’s operations.

There is also SAIC, or Science Applications International Corporation, which was founded in the 1960s. It, too, has largely operated out of the public eye, providing consulting services to the Pentagon and helping it organize its work.

These are service companies. They are not weapons manufacturers in the strict sense, but they enable the Pentagon to operate its military equipment. The so-called “Global War on Terror” accelerated the privatization of services within the Pentagon, particularly intelligence and logistics.

You may have heard of Halliburton, which was one of the main providers of various services to the US armed forces in Iraq. There was also Blackwater, a private military company.

In the early 2000s, then, the privatization of the Pentagon’s security sector accelerated.

I believe the startups I discussed in my article emerged within this same context. The Pentagon increasingly turned to private companies for services that went beyond supplying tanks, fighter jets, or bombers. These services brought private firms ever closer to the battlefield and helped the Pentagon kill people on the ground.

Palantir and Anduril are two examples. Both operate in the artificial intelligence sector, and their activities fit squarely within this broader trend toward the privatization of security.

In my article, I also mentioned companies such as Amazon Web Services, Microsoft, and Google. They, too, provide services to the Pentagon, allowing it to use software developed by companies specializing in artificial intelligence. These contracts involve enormous sums of money.

As for Europe, it has several major companies that manufacture conventional weapons.

In Germany, for example, there is Rheinmetall.

There is also BAE Systems, although its situation is somewhat different because it has extensive operations in the United States. Its presence there is so substantial that some people wonder whether it has become more American than British.

So Europe does have an established arms industry. At the same time, efforts are underway to develop companies working on artificial intelligence for military use.

Helsing is one example, although it remains a relatively limited case.

What we are seeing in Europe today is that, with the exception of France, which is trying to pursue a more independent policy and encourage the development of a European arms industry, including in artificial intelligence, most European countries are concerned primarily with integrating into the US artificial intelligence system.

This is happening particularly through NATO, as well as through relationships with companies such as Microsoft, Google, and Palantir.

Q: So would it be fair to say that the Pentagon is the center of gravity for this entire private sector?

A: I believe the Pentagon is a major driving force. Its budget is enormous, far larger than the defense budgets of any other armed forces around the world. When the Pentagon purchases military equipment, it often does so in large quantities, with a significant impact on particular sectors.

Another development is taking place alongside this. Companies developing military applications for artificial intelligence have managed to place some of their former employees in positions within the Pentagon. This is known as the “revolving door”: the movement of people between the private sector and government institutions.

This, in turn, encourages the Pentagon to purchase more of these systems.

There is no doubt that the Pentagon plays a central role in driving this sector, largely because of the sheer size of its budget.

The effects are first felt among the United States’ closest allies: NATO member states, as well as countries such as Australia and Japan.

The influence then extends, and is already beginning to extend, to other parts of the world, particularly China, where military applications of artificial intelligence are also being developed. It is important to note, however, that much of China’s work in this field is a response to developments in the United States.

Q: Can these companies continue operating without the Pentagon?

A: The situation is somewhat different for traditional weapons manufacturers such as Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, and Boeing, because some of them also have substantial operations in the civilian sector.

Companies such as Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman might be able to survive without the Pentagon, but they would have to produce more equipment for civilian markets. Such a transition would almost certainly be difficult.

Let me digress briefly to point out that something similar happened at the end of the Cold War. As the Cold War drew to a close in the early 1990s, particularly in 1990 and 1991, the Pentagon’s budget was reduced.

The Pentagon feared that these cuts would cause companies to lose interest in weapons production. In other words, it worried that a decline in military orders would gradually push companies out of the defense sector.

Its concern was that, if this happened, the United States would no longer have enough suppliers to provide its armed forces with tanks, fighter jets, bombers, submarines, and other equipment.

At the time, the Pentagon encouraged the many arms manufacturers that had operated during the Cold War to merge.

As a result, a number of companies abandoned their military activities and shifted their focus to other sectors.

I believe Texas Instruments was among them. It largely withdrew from its military operations, selling those activities to other companies that chose to focus exclusively on the military sector.

The giant US arms manufacturers we know today, including Lockheed Martin, are therefore largely the product of the mergers that took place in the 1990s. At the time, these companies were facing a real question of survival. There were simply more of them than a relatively limited defense budget could sustain.

But this process created another problem. The mergers made the remaining companies larger and more important, to the point that the Pentagon itself became heavily dependent on them. If these companies disappeared, the Pentagon, to put it somewhat dramatically, would no longer be able to obtain the weapons it needs.

These companies therefore cannot be allowed to go bankrupt. Whatever happens, their survival must be guaranteed so that they can continue supplying the Pentagon with weapons.

So, to return to your question about whether these companies can survive without the Pentagon: that is only one side of the issue. In my view, the relationship between them is one of mutual dependence.

Something similar is probably happening today with companies such as Palantir, and perhaps Microsoft, Google, and others. This relationship of mutual dependence is beginning to take shape and grow stronger in the newer sectors of the arms industry.

Q: You refer to the concept of “interstate war.” What kind of war do you mean, specifically?

A: The military use of artificial intelligence emerged in the context of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, particularly the wars fought by the United States in those two countries. For the companies developing these military applications, the contracts generated substantial revenue, but the sums involved remained relatively limited.

The war on terror is expensive. But compared with a major war between great powers, such as the First or Second World Wars, or a possible future war between the United States and China, as some analysts imagine, it remains limited in scale and cost. These latter conflicts are what we might call interstate wars in the full sense of the term: wars on an enormous scale.

I want to emphasize this point. Military artificial intelligence was initially developed within the framework of the war on terror. And I insist on this distinction: from the US perspective, these were small wars. But they were by no means small wars for Afghanistan and Iraq. For the people living in those countries, they were vast and devastating conflicts. From Washington’s perspective, however, they were relatively limited.

Military AI developed in precisely this context.

The commercial opportunities become much greater, at least potentially, when the Pentagon begins to consider using artificial intelligence in a war between major powers. Such a conflict could pit the United States against Russia, although that possibility seems less likely at present, or against China.

When I speak of an “interstate war,” I mean a conventional war on something like the scale of the Second World War.

Q: In the recent war, Iran targeted data centers in Gulf countries. Does this amount to an attack on the global economy, or on the infrastructure underpinning artificial intelligence? Do you see it as a threat to technological supremacy?

A: The United States is using artificial intelligence in its war against Iran. AI systems require data centers to operate, particularly those belonging to Amazon. If data centers in the United Arab Emirates, for example, are being used by the US armed forces in their war against Iran, then they are providing services that support military operations. In the context of a war, it is therefore understandable that these data centers would become military targets. It is somewhat like targeting a company that manufactures missiles during a conflict. From this perspective, I can understand the logic behind such an attack.

But the issue raises a broader question about the destruction of infrastructure. Targeting and destroying infrastructure during armed conflicts is a practice that the United States and its NATO allies have played a major role in establishing.

In my view, the Kosovo war was an important turning point in the development of this practice. I am referring to the war against Serbia, launched primarily by NATO member states in 1998 and 1999. During that war, NATO bombing did not focus solely on the Serbian armed forces, which were difficult to locate and target. It also began targeting infrastructure, including electricity-generating facilities. NATO countries argued that, although these facilities supplied electricity to civilians, they also served the military.

So when we discuss the bombing of infrastructure today, it is important to remember who first opened this Pandora’s box and set this process in motion: the United States and its allies.

The question of technological supremacy deserves somewhat separate consideration. From my reading of numerous official Pentagon statements and documents, as well as speeches by people working in these industries, I have identified a discourse that presents artificial intelligence as the pinnacle of technological development in our time.

This discourse, promoted by these companies and certain circles within the Pentagon, links advances in artificial intelligence to the idea of Western, white, and civilizational superiority. In other words, progress in AI is presented as proof of the superiority of the West and its civilization. In my view, this is an extremely troubling discourse.

Q: There is a sense that most countries in the Global South will have little real chance of protecting themselves against data collection. Take Lebanon, for example, which recently signed an agreement with Oracle to train academics and 50,000 public-sector employees in the use of artificial intelligence. The agreement was signed amid Israel’s campaign of ethnic cleansing in southern Lebanon. Critics argue that partnering with a US tech giant deeply integrated into Israel’s military and intelligence infrastructure poses risks to digital sovereignty. Do you consider these concerns justified?

A: What you raise is indeed cause for concern, and I believe these fears are entirely justified. The example you mention, of Oracle and Lebanon, is particularly troubling. The Lebanese government’s decision to sign an agreement with the company in the context of these ethnic-cleansing operations raises serious questions.

The first issue I would point to is the creation of dependency through technology. These American companies are enormous corporations, and it is difficult to escape the framework they impose. This is not an entirely new phenomenon. The history of international relations offers examples of the same dynamic, although in fields that were less technologically advanced.

In the past, when Britain was the dominant imperial power, it provided a form of security for maritime trade routes and other lines of communication. Countries seeking to trade with Europe therefore depended, to some extent, on British policy in this area. British dominance made it difficult to break free from the framework it imposed and from its system for managing what are commonly known as the “commons,” or shared resources and spaces.

So the problem is not entirely new. It is re-emerging today through the technologies we are discussing. One might argue that a way for countries in the Global South to confront this problem would be to develop their own technologies, build their own data centers, and establish national companies. But I believe this would be difficult, because the existing system is already deeply entrenched.

We are dealing with technologies, companies, and protocols developed in the United States, which holds a dominant position in this field.

China is trying to develop its own alternatives. But I am not sure, at this stage, that these can meet the needs of all the countries in the Global South that might want to free themselves from US dominance.

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Ultimately, the question is not who governs Israel, but what kind of Israel it chooses to be, and whether it is prepared to reconsider the political project that defines its relationship with the Palestinian people. Shorten repeated explanations of controlBreak up long analytical sentences

Israel Seeks to Change the Government, Not the Project