{"id":3954,"date":"2026-11-20T17:45:55","date_gmt":"2026-11-20T17:45:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/alkhat.media\/%d8%ad%d9%83%d9%88%d9%85%d8%a9-%d8%a3%d9%8a%d8%b2%d9%86%d9%83%d9%88%d8%aa-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d8%b4%d8%b1%d9%88%d8%b9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d9%8a%d8%a7%d8%b3%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a5%d8%b3%d8%b1%d8%a7\/"},"modified":"2026-11-21T11:52:34","modified_gmt":"2026-11-21T11:52:34","slug":"israel-seeks-to-change-the-government-not-the-project","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/alkhat.media\/en\/israel-seeks-to-change-the-government-not-the-project\/","title":{"rendered":"Israel Seeks to Change the Government, Not the Project"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>The significance of Gadi Eisenkot potentially becoming Israel\u2019s next prime minister lies not simply in replacing Benjamin Netanyahu with another political and military figure. It lies in what this change could mean for the management of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict after October 7, 2023, and amid the military, political, and international crises facing Israel.<\/p>\n<p>The real question is not whether an Eisenkot government would differ from Netanyahu\u2019s. It almost certainly would. The question is whether these differences would go beyond style and methods to affect the substance of Israeli policy toward the Palestinians, including the future of the occupied territories and the Palestinian people\u2019s national and political rights.<\/p>\n<p>An examination of Eisenkot\u2019s positions and those of the political forces that might join his government suggests that any change would be significant in certain respects. But it would not necessarily signal a strategic shift toward ending the occupation of the territories occupied in 1967, recognizing Palestinian self-determination, or accepting an independent Palestinian state. More likely, an Eisenkot government would seek to reorganize Israeli control over Gaza and the West Bank and move away from the political and ideological disorder that characterized Netanyahu\u2019s government. It would do so, however, without abandoning the security doctrine that has shaped Israeli policy toward the Palestinian territories for decades.<\/p>\n<p>Three levels of change must be distinguished: a change in political leadership, a change in the methods used to manage the conflict, and a change in the political project governing Israel\u2019s relationship with the Palestinians. The first two can take place without the third. This distinction is central to understanding the limits of any potential shift in Israel.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"gaza-from-war-to-the-reorganization-of-control\">Gaza: From War to the Reorganization of Control<\/h2>\n<p>Gaza will be the first and most difficult test for any new Israeli government. The war has shown that destroying Hamas\u2019s military infrastructure, however extensively, does not automatically produce a political alternative capable of governing the Strip. Israel\u2019s military superiority has also failed to answer the basic questions of governance, legitimacy, and stability.<\/p>\n<p>The war has exposed a fundamental gap between the ability to destroy infrastructure and the ability to establish an alternative political order. Israel can use military force to weaken its adversaries, but it cannot manufacture Palestinian political legitimacy or impose a stable, sustainable system of government by force alone.<\/p>\n<p>Eisenkot appears more inclined than Netanyahu to set measurable objectives, establish a timetable for ending Hamas rule, and seek an alternative framework for governing Gaza. This could open the door to an arrangement combining a Palestinian technocratic administration, Arab and international involvement, and Israeli security oversight.<\/p>\n<p>But what would such an arrangement actually entail? Would it establish an independent Palestinian governing system in Gaza, or create a Palestinian civilian administration operating under Israeli security control?<\/p>\n<p>The difference is substantial. The first could allow Palestinians to regain control over their affairs and open the way to reunifying Palestinian institutions in Gaza and the West Bank. The second would reproduce a model of local administration under military control. Palestinians would manage day-to-day services, while Israel retained strategic authority over security, borders, movement, and reconstruction.<\/p>\n<p>At least in the initial phase, Eisenkot would likely favor the second option, given Israel\u2019s security considerations and his limited confidence in the prospect of a political settlement with the Palestinians.<\/p>\n<p>The potential difference between Netanyahu and Eisenkot, then, may lie less in their ultimate objective of maintaining Israeli security control than in how they seek to achieve it and at what cost. Netanyahu\u2019s policy has been marked by competing centers of decision-making, the political exploitation of the war, and contradictory visions for Gaza\u2019s future. An Eisenkot government may pursue a more coherent approach, based on regional and international arrangements and a clearer division of responsibilities.<\/p>\n<p>But a more orderly policy does not necessarily mean a different one.<\/p>\n<p>An Eisenkot government could change the form of governance in Gaza without addressing the political conditions that produced the conflict. That would remain the case if reconstruction were not linked to a political process that recognizes Palestinian national rights and interests, rather than being reduced to security arrangements.<\/p>\n<p>Nor would excluding Hamas from government resolve the question of Palestinian political representation. Without an arrangement that enjoys internal Palestinian legitimacy, neither a technocratic nor an international administration could guarantee long-term stability. If reconstruction is separated from Palestinian national rights, it risks becoming a way to manage the humanitarian crisis rather than address its political roots.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"the-west-bank-halting-formal-annexation-while-continuing-de-facto-annexation\">The West Bank: Halting Formal Annexation While Continuing De Facto Annexation<\/h2>\n<p>If Gaza will test a new government&#8217;s ability to end the war and establish a political alternative, the West Bank will test its willingness to confront the religious-nationalist right and define the limits of the settlement project.<\/p>\n<p>Eisenkot opposes the formal annexation of the West Bank. But this position does not necessarily reflect recognition of Palestinian national rights. It is largely rooted in demographic and strategic concerns about Israel\u2019s future and its identity as a state with a Jewish majority.<\/p>\n<p>This distinction matters. Opposing annexation does not mean opposing occupation. Nor does rejecting the extension of Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank imply a willingness to end military control over Palestinian territory.<\/p>\n<p>An Eisenkot government could therefore halt certain measures aimed at formal annexation, reorganize the distribution of authority within the Civil Administration, and strengthen the role of the military and security establishment at the expense of ministers Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir.<\/p>\n<p>It could also enforce the law more strictly against settler attacks and seek to curb activities that displace Palestinians from their communities, particularly in areas where settler violence has intensified.<\/p>\n<p>Yet these measures would not necessarily halt settlement expansion, dismantle existing settlements, or recognize the Palestinians\u2019 right to an independent state.<\/p>\n<p>Instead, Israel could pursue a policy that halts legal annexation while allowing de facto annexation to continue through territorial control, settlement expansion, and control over resources, movement, and urban planning.<\/p>\n<p>The danger is that opposition to formal annexation could provide political and diplomatic cover for the gradual annexation of Palestinian land. Israeli control would become more acceptable internationally without changing on the ground.<\/p>\n<p>Eisenkot may succeed in slowing the annexation project advanced by the religious and nationalist right. But he may ultimately settle for managing the occupation rather than dismantling it.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"the-palestinian-authority-a-security-partner-or-a-political-partner\">The Palestinian Authority: A Security Partner or a Political Partner?<\/h2>\n<p>The Palestinian Authority is likely to figure prominently in the calculations of an Eisenkot government. Unlike those who believe that weakening or collapsing the Authority would serve Israeli interests, Eisenkot understands that its collapse would create a security and administrative vacuum that Israel would have to fill.<\/p>\n<p>Such a vacuum could expand Hamas\u2019s influence, make Israeli control over Palestinian cities more difficult, and increase the military and economic costs of the occupation.<\/p>\n<p>His government may therefore seek to restore the Authority\u2019s economic and institutional capacity, maintain security coordination, and prevent the collapse of its security apparatus.<\/p>\n<p>But at what political cost, and toward what end?<\/p>\n<p>If strengthening the Palestinian Authority means making it more capable of controlling Palestinian society, without offering a political horizon or genuine sovereign powers, Israel would effectively be using it to administer the occupation and reduce its own burdens. It would not be treating the Authority as a partner in a political settlement.<\/p>\n<p>The implications go beyond immediate security concerns. They also concern the future of the Palestinian political system. An Authority that continues to perform administrative and security functions while losing its ability to shape Palestinians\u2019 lives and represent their national aspirations will face an increasingly severe crisis of legitimacy.<\/p>\n<p>Rehabilitating the Palestinian Authority without addressing the structural causes of its crisis or linking its role to a clear political process would therefore amount to a temporary administrative response to an ongoing political crisis.<\/p>\n<p>Restoring the Authority\u2019s standing may represent a change in Israel\u2019s methods, but not necessarily in its political vision toward the Palestinians.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"gaza-and-the-west-bank-will-israel-retain-control-over-both\">Gaza and the West Bank: Will Israel Retain Control Over Both?<\/h2>\n<p>Gaza and the West Bank cannot be treated as separate files. Their futures are closely connected. Any governing arrangement in Gaza will directly affect the position of the Palestinian Authority and the possibility of reunifying Palestinian political institutions.<\/p>\n<p>One major risk is that a new Israeli government will establish two separate systems: a limited Palestinian administration in Gaza and a Palestinian Authority with restricted powers in the West Bank, while Israel retains security and strategic control over both.<\/p>\n<p>Under this scenario, there would be no genuine Palestinian political or territorial unity. Instead, two administrative systems would operate under Israeli authority, each to a different degree.<\/p>\n<p>This separation is more than an administrative problem. It would undermine the possibility of a unified Palestinian entity and prevent the emergence of a leadership capable of negotiating on behalf of the Palestinian people on the basis of a shared national project.<\/p>\n<p>One of the most important tests for any new Israeli government, therefore, will be its position on restoring political and institutional ties between Gaza and the West Bank, not simply its choice of who should govern the Strip.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"coalition-contradictions-a-government-of-change-or-an-agreement-to-manage-differences\">Coalition Contradictions: A Government of Change or an Agreement to Manage Differences?<\/h2>\n<p>Eisenkot\u2019s positions alone cannot tell us what his government would do. Its coalition composition will determine how much room he has to maneuver.<\/p>\n<p>Bringing figures such as Naftali Bennett, Avigdor Lieberman, Yair Lapid, and Yair Golan into one government would bring together sharply divergent positions on the future of the occupied Palestinian territories.<\/p>\n<p>Bennett represents a more hardline right-wing current committed to the settlement project. He does not consider separation from the Palestinians necessary. Lieberman holds hardline nationalist and security positions. Lapid is more open to regional arrangements, while Golan advocates a position more receptive to political and territorial separation from the Palestinians.<\/p>\n<p>Eisenkot, meanwhile, seeks to balance national security considerations, the preservation of Israel\u2019s Jewish character, and the need to prevent further deterioration in Israel\u2019s international relations.<\/p>\n<p>The common ground among these forces may therefore be their opposition to Netanyahu, rather than any shared vision for the future of the Palestinians.<\/p>\n<p>A united opposition to Netanyahu is not the same as agreement on an alternative political project. The former may be enough to form a government, but it does not guarantee a common position on occupation, settlements, or Palestinian statehood.<\/p>\n<p>These differences are likely to produce a policy of managing disagreements and postponing major strategic decisions, particularly those concerning settlements and the prospect of a Palestinian state.<\/p>\n<p>The result could be a government capable of reversing some of Netanyahu\u2019s most extreme policies but unable to establish a coherent alternative. Its members may agree on what should stop, without agreeing on what should replace it.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"restoring-international-legitimacy-without-changing-the-substance-of-policy\">Restoring International Legitimacy Without Changing the Substance of Policy<\/h2>\n<p>Another factor that could push an Eisenkot government toward a different approach to Gaza and the West Bank is its desire to repair Israel\u2019s international relations, particularly with the United States, European countries, and Arab states.<\/p>\n<p>The war has shown that maintaining military control without a political horizon carries growing costs for Israel. These extend beyond its international image to its economic, diplomatic, and security relations.<\/p>\n<p>A new government may therefore seek to restore Washington\u2019s confidence, reopen channels of cooperation with Arab states, and link Gaza\u2019s reconstruction to broader regional initiatives.<\/p>\n<p>But this shift should not be overstated. Restoring relations with Arab countries or improving Israel\u2019s international standing does not necessarily mean making substantial concessions to the Palestinians.<\/p>\n<p>The main objective may instead be to reduce the international costs of Israeli policy and create a more favorable regional environment for new security and economic arrangements, without changing the nature of Israeli control over Palestinian territory.<\/p>\n<p>Israel may also seek to reintegrate itself into broader regional frameworks, taking advantage of the willingness of some Arab actors to cooperate on security, economic development, and reconstruction. Such cooperation would not necessarily be tied to a commitment to end the occupation or establish a Palestinian state.<\/p>\n<p>This could produce a new form of Israeli pragmatism: broader diplomatic engagement and greater tactical flexibility, alongside continued resistance to Palestinian sovereignty and political independence.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"what-changed-after-october-7\">What Changed After October 7?<\/h2>\n<p>The potential policies of an Eisenkot government cannot be understood without considering how October 7 transformed Israeli security and political thinking.<\/p>\n<p>The attack shattered the assumptions behind Israel\u2019s policy of containing the conflict and returned security to the top of its priorities. At the same time, it exposed the limits of Israeli military power and its inability to guarantee lasting security and stability.<\/p>\n<p>This contradiction is likely to strengthen two parallel tendencies within Israel\u2019s political and security establishment. One calls for tighter security control to prevent new military threats. The other recognizes that maintaining the status quo without a political horizon creates growing strategic risks.<\/p>\n<p>But acknowledging this dilemma does not mean that Israel\u2019s establishment is ready to embrace a political solution. For some in Israel, the lesson of October 7 may serve as further justification for refusing to withdraw from Palestinian territory, rather than as an incentive to end the occupation.<\/p>\n<p>An Eisenkot government may be more aware of the risks created by Netanyahu\u2019s policies without being any more willing to reconsider the basic assumptions underlying Israel\u2019s approach to the Palestinians.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"the-fundamental-dilemma-a-jewish-state-neither-full-annexation-nor-a-palestinian-state\">The Fundamental Dilemma: A Jewish State, Neither Full Annexation Nor a Palestinian State<\/h2>\n<p>The deepest contradiction in Eisenkot\u2019s political outlook, in my view, is that he opposes full annexation of the West Bank because of its potential impact on Israel\u2019s demographic character, yet does not necessarily support an independent Palestinian state at this stage. At the same time, he wants to preserve Israeli security control.<\/p>\n<p>This equation offers no lasting solution.<\/p>\n<p>Without formal annexation, an independent Palestinian state, or an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, the existing system of control will continue. Only the methods of administering it and the level of friction it produces may change.<\/p>\n<p>This exposes a deeper contradiction between the Zionist project, in its demographic and political form, and the reality of controlling another people while denying them sovereignty. Israel wants to retain the land without assuming the political, demographic, and legal consequences of annexing its Palestinian population. It also wants to guarantee its security without withdrawing from the territory it controls.<\/p>\n<p>Over time, this could lead to de facto annexation without a formal declaration. Israel would continue to control the land, resources, and borders, while Palestinians remained deprived of sovereignty and independence.<\/p>\n<p>From this perspective, the fundamental difference between Netanyahu and Eisenkot may not concern the future of the occupation itself, but how it is managed and how much risk Israel is willing to take to maintain it.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"a-change-of-government-not-of-political-project\">A Change of Government, Not of Political Project<\/h2>\n<p>If Gadi Eisenkot becomes prime minister, Israeli policy toward the Palestinians could undergo tangible changes. These may include reducing the influence of the religious-nationalist Zionist current, halting certain annexation measures, changing the approach to the Palestinian Authority, and adopting a more disciplined policy toward Gaza.<\/p>\n<p>But these changes would not, on their own, amount to a strategic transformation of Israel\u2019s political project.<\/p>\n<p>The real test will not be Eisenkot\u2019s statements against annexation or settler violence. It will be the decisions his government makes about settlement expansion, Israel\u2019s military presence in the West Bank, Palestinian sovereignty, Gaza\u2019s reconstruction, and the relationship between the Palestinian Authority and the Strip.<\/p>\n<p>Five practical questions will help determine the nature of any potential shift:<\/p>\n<p><strong>First:<\/strong> Will the new government actually halt settlement expansion, or simply block measures aimed at formal annexation?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Second:<\/strong> Will it work to end Israeli control over Palestinian territory, or merely reorganize that control and soften its most internationally objectionable aspects?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Third:<\/strong> Will it treat the Palestinian Authority as a political partner representing a people with national rights, or as an administrative and security apparatus tasked with maintaining the existing order?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Fourth:<\/strong> Will it link Gaza\u2019s reconstruction to the reunification of the Palestinian political system, or deepen the separation between the Strip and the West Bank?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Fifth:<\/strong> Will it accept a clear, time-bound, and binding political process leading to Palestinian self-determination, or continue invoking the argument that \u201cthe time is not right\u201d to postpone any political commitment?<\/p>\n<p>These questions will reveal whether a change of government leads to a genuine reassessment of Israeli policy or simply improves the tools used to manage it.<\/p>\n<p>The potential difference between Netanyahu and Eisenkot may ultimately come down to a shift from ideological to pragmatic, security-driven management of the conflict. It may mean moving from a government that seeks to expand and normalize control through annexation to one that seeks to preserve that control while reducing its political and international costs.<\/p>\n<p>Significant as this difference may be, it will amount to a fundamental change only when Israel moves beyond asking how to control the Palestinians and begins asking how to end that control and recognize their legitimate national and political rights.<\/p>\n<p>Ultimately, the question is not who governs Israel, but what kind of Israel it chooses to be, and whether it is prepared to reconsider the political project that defines its relationship with the Palestinian people.<\/p>\n<p>Shorten repeated explanations of controlBreak up long analytical sentences<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"The significance of Gadi Eisenkot potentially becoming Israel\u2019s next prime minister lies not simply in replacing Benjamin Netanyahu&hellip;","protected":false},"author":20,"featured_media":3955,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"csco_display_header_overlay":false,"csco_singular_sidebar":"","csco_page_header_type":"","csco_page_load_nextpost":"","csco_post_video_location":[],"csco_post_video_location_hash":"","csco_post_video_url":"","csco_post_video_bg_start_time":0,"csco_post_video_bg_end_time":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[39],"class_list":["post-3954","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-analysis","tag-39","cs-entry","cs-video-wrap"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v28.8 - 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